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Abstract—In this paper, we propose a multi-authority
attribute-based signcryption scheme with efficient revocation for
smart grid downlink communications. In the proposed scheme,
grid operators and electricity vendors can send multicast mes-
sages securely to different groups of consumers which is required
in different applications such as firmware update distribution and
sending direct load control messages. Our scheme can ensure
the confidentiality and the integrity of the multicasted messages,
allows consumers to authenticate the source of the multicasted
messages, achieves and non-repudiation property, and allows
prompt revocation, simultaneously which are required for the
smart grid downlink communications. Our security analysis
demonstrates that the proposed scheme can thwart various
security threats to the smart grid. Our experiments conducted
on an advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) testbed confirm
that the proposed scheme has low computational overhead.
I. INTRODUCTION
The smart grid (SG) is the next generation of the tradi-
tional power grid. It integrates information and communication
technologies with traditional power grid to provide two-way
communications between the grids major entities including
grid operators, electricity vendors, and electricity consumers
to ensure the efficient and reliable operation of the grid. One
of the main components of the SG is the advanced metering
infrastructure (AMI) networks which connect smart meters
(SMs) installed at consumers’ houses to the grid operators
and vendors.
Multi-authority AMI networks, which are deployed in most
European countries and several states in the U.S., allow
energy deregulation, i.e., electricity retailing through different
electricity vendors [1]–[3]. Therefore, consumers not only can
choose from a number of independent third party electricity
vendors, but pricing options are also more plentiful due to the
competition between these different vendors. Figure 1 shows
the conceptual architecture a multi-authority AMI network [3].
As shown in the figure, data communication can be either
uplink or downlink communication.
In the uplink data communication, data is sent by SMs to
grid operators and vendors. This can allow the automated col-
lection of metering data in which grid operators and vendors
collect fine-grained power consumption data (PCD) at high
rates, e.g., few minutes, for real-time grid monitoring, and
energy distribution management. For example, fine-grained
data analysis can be used for the reduction of the peak-to-
average ratio which can help in preventing blackouts, fail-
ures to supply electricity [4]–[6]. Also, fine-grained PCD are
needed for real-time price-based demand/response programs
in which electricity prices vary depending on the supply-to-
demand ratio especially during peak hours [7], [8].
On the other hand, in the downlink data communications,
data is sent by grid operators or electricity vendors to a group
of SMs. The downlink communication should ensure secure
multicast for different applications. For example, sending
firmware and configuration updates to a group of SMs in
specific areas requires secure multicast [9], [10]. Also, in
direct load control (DLC) demand/response programs, grid
operators need to send DLC messages to a group of users, that
subscribe to the same DLC demand/response plan, in order
to turn off/on some specific load during peak/regular hours
[11], [12]. Moreover, electricity vendors may send charging
schedules to a group of users in selected areas to charge their
electric vehicles or home batteries [13], [14]. Furthermore,
electricity vendors may send energy trading requests to a
group of users in selected areas that are subscribed to energy
charging/discharging plans, asking for energy injection to the
SG during peak hours [15], [16].
Extensive research has been conducted to study the security
and privacy issues in AMI networks. However, most of the
existing schemes address consumers’ privacy, data integrity
and authenticity in uplink communication [17]. Few schemes
have been proposed to study the security of the downlink
communications in AMI networks. Moreover, the IEEE 802.11
protocol, which is the underlying protocol for AMI networks
cannot be used for secure multicast communication efficiently
and effectively [18]. Therefore, there is a need for a scheme
that not only allows secure multicast communication, but also
considers the unique characteristics of multi-authority AMI
networks. Specifically, a good secure multicast scheme should
ensure message confidentiality, i.e., the multicasted messages
can be decrypted only by the intended users. In addition,
the scheme should allow dynamic group memberships, i.e.,
members’ enrollment/revocation should be done efficiently and
promptly since they can subscribe/unsubscribe to any plan with
any vendor at any time. Moreover, users should be able to
authenticate the senders of the multicasted messages. Further-
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Fig. 1: Network model for SG downlink communications.
more, message non-repudiation property should be achieved.
In order to address the aforementioned challenges, we
propose in this paper a multi-authority attribute-based sign-
cryption scheme that can be used to secure SG downlink
communications. We construct our scheme based on, but not
limited to, the multi-authority attribute based encryption (MA-
ABE) scheme proposed in [19]. To the best of our knowledge,
this paper proposes the first fully decentralized multi-authority
attribute based signcryption scheme that can ensure data
confidentiality, sender authentication, and non-repudiation, and
allow prompt attribute revocation, simultaneously.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Related
works are discussed in Section II. The considered system
models and the design goals are presented in Section III.
Preliminaries are given in Section IV. The proposed scheme is
explained in Section V. The security analysis and performance
evaluation are given in Sections VI and VII, respectively.
Conclusions are drawn in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORKS
The SG downlink communication has been considered in
several schemes [20]–[22]. However, these schemes consider
only broadcast downlink communication and cannot support
multicast communication. Several schemes have been pro-
posed to ensure fine-grained access control and/or secure
multicast for the SG communications [23]–[25]. In the ABE
scheme proposed in [26], Liu et al. proposed a multi-authority
access control scheme with attribute revocation for the SG
[23]. In the proposed scheme, if a user’s attributes can satisfy
the access policy associated with a ciphertext, this user can
decrypt that ciphertext only after receiving a unique token from
a central entity called third party auditor (TPA). Therefore, the
proposed scheme [23] cannot support multicast communica-
tion efficiently since the TPA must send a unique token to each
member in a multicast group using unicast communication,
i.e., a unicast downlink communication is needed to decrypt
any multicast message. In [24], Fadlullah et al. have proposed
a secure multicast scheme for SG communications using the
key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE) [27]. How-
ever, the scheme is limited to single attribute authority, i.e,
a single authority controls all attributes. Also, it does not
support sender authentication and non-repudiation. In [25], Hu
et al. have proposed an attribute-based signcryption scheme
to secure multicast communications in the SG. The scheme
proposes a modification to CP-ABE [28] in order to achieve
attribute-based encryption, data-origin authenticity and non-
repudiation. However, the scheme is limited to single attribute
authority and does not support attribute revocation.
Different from the above schemes, our scheme allows
(1) multiple authorities to issue and control their own at-
tributes; (2) data-origin authenticity and non-repudiation; and
(3) prompt attribute revocation, simultaneously.
III. SYSTEM MODELS AND DESIGN GOALS
A. Network Model
The considered network model is shown in Figure 1. This
model was used in [2], [3] to secure uplink smart grid
communications. In this paper, we aim to secure the down-
link communications. The network model has the following
entities.
• Distribution Network Operators (DNOs). We consider
a set of DNO companies, D = {Dj , 1 ≤ j ≤ Nd}.
Each Dj is licensed to distribute electricity in a particular
geographic area j. Each DNO manages and operates the
distribution networks within its area.
• Electricity Vendors. We consider a set of electricity
vendor companies, V = {Vk, 1 ≤ k ≤ Ns}. Each Vk
is responsible for supplying electricity to its users who
may be located at different areas.
• Users. We consider a set of users U = {ui, 1 ≤ i ≤ Nu}.
Users can change from one vendor to another at any
time. In addition, users can add, change, and remove
plans offered by the same vendor at any time. An SM
is installed at each user’s house that communicates with
the DNOs and electricity vendors through a node called
the data communication company (DCC).
• Data Communication Company (DCC). It has the re-
sponsibility of delivering the downlink communications
received from operators and vendors to users.
• Networking Facilities. They form a hierarchical network
structure to connect the DCC to SMs at users’ side
through a WAN-GW, a NAN-GW, and a BAN-GW as
shown in the figure.
B. Threat Model
There exist an adversary A that can eavesdrop all the
transmitted messages. A may try to decrypt the multicasted
messages to revel any sensitive information sent to any group
of users. Users also may try to breach data confidentiality, i.e,
they may try to decrypt the multicasted messages intended
to other groups of users. In addition, a malicious user may
collude with other users or A in order to decrypt a ciphertext
that they can not decrypt individually. Moreover, A may try
to launch active attacks by injecting malicious messages to
any group of users, e.g. sending malwares instead of firmware
updates to have full control on their devices.
C. Design Goals
Based on the aforementioned network and threat models,
the following goals should be achieved.
1) Secure multicast and data confidentiality. Only selected
users by the grid operators or vendors should be able to
decrypt the multicasted messages. Other users should be
prevented from accessing these messages.
2) Collusion resistance. Users that are not supposed to
decrypt a ciphertext individually, should not be able to
decrypt it even if they collude together by using their
secret keys.
3) Sender authentication and non-repudiation. Users should
be able to authenticate the sender of the multicas-
ted messages. Messages form A should be detected
and discarded. Also, non-repudiation property should be
achieved.
4) Prompt Revocation. Only valid, i.e. non-revoked, users
should be able to decrypt the multicasted ciphertext.
Revocation process should be done immediately without
any delays.
IV. PRELIMINARIES
A. The Chinese Remainder Theorem
Let {q1, q2, . . . , qm} be m pairwise relatively primes and
let {b1, b2, . . . , bm} be m arbitrary integers. The Chinese Re-
mainder Theorem (CRT) states that the system of congruences
B ≡ bi mod qi for 1 ≤ i ≤ m has a unique solution modulo
Q =
∏n
i=1 qi. The unique solution B is given by
B =
m∑
i=1
biQiyi mod Q
where Qi = Qqi and yi ≡ 1Qi mod qi for 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
B. Multi-Authority Attribute-Based Encryption [19]
Let U = {u1, . . . , un} be the universe of the attributes,
Uθ = {θ1, . . . , θn} be the universe of the attribute authorities
controlling the n attributes, and GID = {GID1, . . . ,GIDm}
be the universe of the global identities that identify m users.
1) Linear Secret Sharing and Access Policy: We use the
same definition for linear secret sharing (LSS) and access
policy as in [19] and [26]. Any monotonic boolean formula
over UΘ can be represented as an access matrix as follows.
Let p be a prime. A secret-sharing scheme (Π) over a set of
attributes U is called linear (over Zp) if
1) The ` shares of a secret z ∈ Zp for each attribute form a
vector λ over Zp.
2) There exists a matrix A called the share-generating matrix
for Π. The matrix A has ` rows and n columns. For
all 1 ≤ x ≤ `, the xth row of A is labeled by an
attribute δ(x), where δ is a function that maps rows of A
to attributes from U , i.e., δ: {1, . . . , `} → U . When we
consider the column vector v = (z, r2, . . . , rn), where
{r2, . . . , rn} R←− Zp are randomly chosen, then λ = Av
is the vector of ` shares of the secret z according to Π.
The share λx belongs to the attribute δ(x).
As mentioned in [19], [26], each secret-sharing scheme should
satisfy the following requirements:
• A reconstruction requirement, i.e., each authorized set of
attributes can reconstruct the secret.
• A security requirement, i.e., other sets of attributes,
unauthorized sets, cannot reveal any information about
the secret.
For example, let S denote an authorized set of attributes
and let I be the set of rows whose labels are in S. There exist
constants {ci}i∈I ∈ Zp such that for any valid shares of a
secret z according to Π, it is true that:
∑
i∈I ciλi = z, or
equivalently
∑
i∈I ciAi = (1, 0, . . . , 0), where Ai is the i
th
row of A. In Appendix A, we give an example of generating
the access matrix, computing the vector of secret shares λ and
the reconstruction coefficients {ci}i∈I from a boolean formula.
2) Algorithms: The scheme in [19] consists of the follow-
ing algorithms.
• GlobalSetup(1κ)→ GP
This algorithm takes a security parameter κ and outputs
the public global parameters for the system. The global
parameters (GP) includes U , UΘ, GID, and T which is
a mapping function that maps each attribute in U to a
unique authority in UΘ, i.e., T: U → UΘ.
• AuthoritySetup(GP, θ)→ PKθ,SKθ
This algorithm generates a public/private key pair
{PKθ,SKθ} for each attribute authority θ ∈ UΘ.
• KeyGen(GID, θ, u,SKθ, GP )→ SKGID,u
This algorithm takes the global identity of a user GID ∈
GID, an attribute u ∈ U , the authority θ controlling
the attribute u, the secret key of the authority SKθ, and
the global parameters GP. The algorithm outputs SKGID,u
which is a secret key for the identity-attribute pair used
for decryption.
• Encrypt(M, (A, δ), {PKθ},GP)→ CT
This algorithm takes a message M , an access policy
(A, δ), a set of public keys {PKθ} of the authorities
controlling attributes in the access policy, and the global
parameters GP. The algorithm outputs the ciphertext CT.
• Decrypt(CT, {SKGID,u},GP)→M or ⊥
This algorithm takes the ciphertext CT, the set of se-
cret keys {SKGID,u} of a single user with identity GID
corresponding to different attributes, and the global pa-
rameters, and outputs M if and only if the attribute set
associated with {SKGID,u} can satisfy the access policy
of the ciphertext, otherwise, decryption fails.
V. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we first provide the construction of our
attribute-based signcryption scheme. Then, we discuss how
the scheme can be applied to secure the SG downlink com-
munications.
A. Definitions
Let U1 = {u1, . . . , uj} be the universe of j attributes,
UΘ = {θ1, . . . , θj} be the universe of the attribute authorities
controlling the j attributes, UΦ = {φ1, . . . , φk} be the universe
of entities allowed to signcrypt messages, U2 = {s1, . . . , sk}
be the universe of k identity attributes corresponding to k
signers, GID = {GID1, . . . ,GIDm} be the universe of the
global identities that identifies m users, and Q = {q1, . . . , qm}
be m pairwise relatively prime positive integers where each
prime qi is assigned to a user with GIDi. Let U = U1 ∪ U2
and UΨ = UΘ ∪ UΦ.
In addition, we use the same access structure as [19], [26]
with an additional restriction. The access structure encoded as
a monotonic boolean formula over UΘ and UΦ should be on
the form “The signer identity attribute s ∈ U2” AND “any
monotonic boolean formula over U1”. Therefore, in order to
designcrypt a signcryppted text, a user should do the following
• Uses the verification key corresponding to the signer φ
controlling the signer identity attribute s.
• Possess attributes satisfying the second part of the
boolean formula.
Moreover, let Gx ⊂ GID be the set of users who holds an
attribute ux. We refer to Gx as the access list of the attribute
ux. Let G = {G1, . . . , Gj} be the universe of access lists of
the j attributes defined in U1.
B. Algorithms
Our scheme consists of the following eight algorithms.
1) GlobalSetup(1κ)→ GP.
This algorithm takes a security parameter κ and outputs
the public global parameters for the system. The global
parameters (GP) includes U , UΨ, GID, and T which is a
mapping function that maps each element in U to a unique
element in UΨ, i.e., T: U → UΨ. More specifically, T
maps each element in U1 to a unique element in UΘ and
maps each element in U2 to a unique element in UΦ.
2) SignKeyGen(GP, φ)→ SKφ.
This algorithm generates a private key SKφ for each entity
φ ∈ UΦ. SKφ is used by a signer φ to add the signature
component to the signcrypted text.
3) AuthoritySetup(GP, θ)→ PKθ,SKθ.
This algorithm generates a public/secret key pair
{PKθ,SKθ} for each attribute authority θ ∈ UΘ. PKθ
is used during the signcryption process, whereas SKθ is
used by the authority θ to generate users’ decryption keys.
4) DecKeyGen(GID, θ, u,SKθ,GP)→ DKGID,u.
This algorithms takes the global identity of a user GID ∈
GID, an attribute u ∈ U1, the authority θ controlling the
attribute u, the secret key of the authority SKθ, and the
global parameters. The algorithm outputs DKGID,u which
is a decryption key for the identity-attribute pair.
5) VerKeyGen(GID, φ, s, SKφ,GP)→ VKGID,φ.
This algorithms takes the global identity of a user GID ∈
GID, the signer identity attribute s ∈ U2 corresponding
to the signer entity φ, the signer private key SKφ, and the
global parameters. The algorithm outputs VKGID,φ which
is the key used by user with GID to verify the messages
signcrypted by entity φ.
6) Signcrypt(M, (A, δ),SKφ, {PKθ},GP)→ ST
This algorithm takes a message M , an access structure
(A, δ), the signer private key SKφ, a set public keys of
the attributes’ authorities in the access policy {PKθ}, and
the global parameters GP and outputs the signcrypted text
ST.
7) Revoke(ST,Q, {G},GP)→ ST′
This algorithm takes a signcrypted text ST including
its access policy (A, δ), the set of prime numbers Q,
{G} which is a set of access lists corresponding to the
attributes defining A, and the global parameters GP. The
algorithm outputs the re-encrypted signcrypted text ST′
such that only users with valid attributes satisfying the
access policy can perform designcryption.
8) Designcrypt(ST′,VKGID,φ, {DKGID,u},GP)→M .
This algorithm takes the re-encrypted signcrypted text
ST′, the verification key VKGID,φ, the set of decryption
keys {DKGID,u} of a single user with identity GID
corresponding to its attributes, and the global parameters.
The algorithm outputs the message M if and only if the
following three conditions are satisfied: (1) the message
was signed by φ; (2) the attribute set associated with
{SKGID,u} can satisfy the access policy of the ciphertext,
and (3) all the attribute set associated with {SKGID,u} are
valid, i.e., none of them has not been revoked, otherwise,
designcryption process fails.
C. System Setup
Generation of Global Parameters. At the initial sys-
tem setup phase, an offline trusted authority (TA) runs the
GlobalSetup algorithm. First, it defines the universe of the
attributes U1, the universe of the attribute authorities UΘ,
the universe of the signer entities UΦ, the universe of the
signers’ identity attributes U2, the universe of the global
identities GID, and the mapping function T: U → UΨ,
where U = U1 ∪ U2 and UΨ = UΘ ∪ UΦ. Then, it generates
a bilinear pairing parameters (p,G,GT , g, eˆ) where G, GT
are a multiplicative cyclic group of prime order p, g is a
generator of G, and e : G × G → GT . It also chooses two
functions, H and F , that map the global identities and the
attributes to elements in G, respectively, i.e., H: GID → G,
and F : U → G. Finally, it publishes the global parameters
GP as GP = {p,G, g,H, F,U ,UΨ,T}. Moreover, the TA
generates the set of m pairwise relatively prime positive
integers Q = {q1, . . . , qm} and assigns qi to a user with GIDi.
Setup of Attribute Authorities. Each attribute author-
ity θ ∈ Uθ runs the AuthSetup algorithm to generate its
public/sectet key pair {PKθ,SKθ}. The algorithm chooses
two random exponents αθ, yθ ∈ Zp and publishes PKθ =
{e(g, g)αθ , gyθ} as the public key of authority θ, whereas the
secret key SKθ = {αθ, yθ} is kept secret.
Private Key Generation. Each signer φ ∈ UΦ runs the
SignKeyGen algorithm to generate its private key SKφ that is
used to add the signature component to the ciphertext. The
algorithm chooses two random exponents αφ, yφ ∈ Zp as the
private keys that are known only to φ.
D. Users’ Key Generation
Key generation phase consists of two operations; (1) the
generation of decryption keys which is executed by attribute
authorities and (2) generation of verification keys which is
executed by the signers.
Generation of Decryption Keys. Each attribute authority
θ runs the DecKeyGen algorithm to generate a decryption key
for each identity-attribute pair, i.e., for user with identity GID
holding an attribute u. First, the algorithm chooses a random
element t ∈ Zp. Then, it computes two components KGID,u =
gαθH(GID)yθF (u)t and K′GID,u = g
t. Finally, the algorithm
outputs the decryption key as DKGID,u = {KGID,u,K′GID,u}.
Generation of Verification Keys. Each signer φ runs
the VerKeyGen algorithm to generate a verification key for
each user. First, the algorithm chooses a random element
r ∈ Zp. Then, it computes KGID,φ = gαφH(GID)yφF (s)r
and K′GID,φ = g
r. Finally, it outputs the verification key as
VKGID,φ = {KGID,φ,K′GID,φ}.
E. Signcryption
When an signer φ wants to signcrypt a message M , it
defines the access matrix A as explained in Appendix A. The
boolean formula that should generate the access policy should
be on the form “The signer identity attribute s ∈ U2” AND
“any monotonic boolean formula over U1”. It should be the
case that s ∈ T−1(φ), i.e., this signer identity attribute s is
controlled by the signer φ.
Then, the signcryptor φ runs the Singcrypt algorithm to
generate the signcrypted text. The algorithm takes a message
M , an access policy (A, δ) with A ∈ Z`×np , the public keys
of the relevant authorities, the private key SKφ, and the global
parameters. Let ρ be a mapping function that maps rows from
the access policy to attribute authorities, i.e, ρ: {1, . . . , `} →
UΘ defined as ρ(.) = T(δ(.)).
First, the algorithm creates vectors v = (z, v2, . . . , vn)> and
w = (0, w2, . . . , wn)
> where {z, v2, . . . , vn, w2, . . . , wn} R←−
Zp. For a secret z ∈ Zp, let λx represents the share corre-
sponding to row x and wx represents the share of a 0. In
Appendix A, we explain how these shares can be computed.
For each row x of A, the algorithm chooses a random tx ∈ Zp
and the signcrypted text is computed as
ST =

(A, δ) , C = Me(g, g)z ,
C1,x = e(g, g)
λxe(g, g)αρ(x)tx ,
C2,x = g
−tx ,
C3,x = g
yρ(x)txgwx ,
C4,x = F (δ(x))
tx

x∈A
 (1)
Note that, based on our definition to the boolen formula
generating the access structure, there is only one row x for
which ρ(x) = φ. Therefore, in order to correctly compute
the components C1,x = e(g, g)λxe(g, g)αφtx and C3,x =
gyφtxgwx , the signcryptor must have the knowledge of αφ and
yφ. Since these two parameters are the private keys known
only to entity φ, no other entity except φ can compute these
components.
F. Revocation
Before sending the signcrypted text to users, the Revoke
algorithm is used to re-encrypt the signcrypted text such that
only users with valid attributes can perform the designcryption
process. For each access list Gx ∈ G corresponding to row x in
the access policy, the algorithm chooses a random key βx ∈ Z∗p
which is a group key for the members of Gx and re-encrypts
only one component of the signcrypted text C2,x to be C ′2,x =
Cβx2,x = g
−βxtx . Only users with valid attribute δ(x) should
be able to recover βx and thus can perform designcryption.
Therefore, for every user with valid attribute, i.e., for every
GIDi ∈ Gx, the algorithm computes bi = βx ⊕ qi where qi is
the prime number corresponding to GIDi and ⊕ is the XOR
operation. Then, the algorithm computes the solution of the
CRT congruence system modulo Qx =
∏
i∈Gx qi as
Bx =
∑
i∈Gx
biQiyi mod Qx
and attaches Bx to re-encrypted signcrypted text as follows
ST′ =

(A, δ) , C = Me(g, g)z ,
C1,x = e(g, g)
λxe(g, g)αρ(x)tx ,
C ′2,x = g
−βxtx ,
C3,x = g
yρ(x)txgwx ,
C4,x = F (δ(x))
tx ,
Bx

x∈A
 (2)
Bx is used to help the users with valid attributes to recover
the secret βx and thus only this set of users can perform
decryption as explained in the next subsection.
G. Designcryption
If a user with identity GID has a set of valid attributes S
that can satisfy the access policy (A, δ) associated with the
signcrypted text and has the verification key of the signer φ,
then for each row x corresponding to the attributes in S, the
user first recovers the group key βx as follows
βx = (Bx mod qi)⊕ qi (3)
This is true as the CRT states that Bx ≡ bi mod qi and
bi ⊕ qi = (βx ⊕ qi) ⊕ qi = βx. It is clear that, since the
solution of the CRT congruence is constructed using only
the prime numbers of users with valid attributes, then only
this set of users can reconstruct βx and can proceed with the
designcryption process. Then, the user can recover C2,x from
C ′2,x as C2,x = C
′ 1βx
2,x . After that, the user computes
Dx = C1,x . e(KGID,δ(x), C2,x).e(H(GID), C3,x).
e(K′GID,δ(x), C4,x)
= e(g, g)λxe(H(GID), g)wx
(4)
The correctness proof of Equation 4 is as follows.
Dx = C1,xe(KGID,δ(x), C2,x)e(H(GID), C3,x)
e(K′GID,δ(x), C4,x)
= e(g, g)λxe(g, g)αρ(x)txe(gαθH(GID)yθF (u)t, g−tx)
e(H(GID), gyρ(x)txgwx)e(gt, F (δ(x))tx)
= e(g, g)λxe(g, g)αθtxe(gαθH(GID)yθF (u)t, g−tx)
e(H(GID), gyθtxgwx)e(gt, F (u)tx)
= e(g, g)λx e(g, g)αθtxe(g, g)−αθtxe(H(GID), g)−yθtx
e(F (u), g)−ttxe(H(GID), g)yθtx
e(H(GID), g)wxe(g, F (u))ttx
= e(g, g)λx e(H(GID), g)wx
(5)
Then, the user computes
D =
∏
x∈S
Dcxx = e(g, g)
z (6)
The correctness proof of Equation 6 is as follows.
D =
∏
x∈S
Dcxx
=
∏
x∈S
(
e(g, g)λx e(H(GID), g)wx
)cx
=
∏
x∈S
e(g, g)λxcx e(H(GID), g)wxcx
= e(g, g)
∑
x∈S λxcx e(H(GID), g)
∑
x∈S wxcx
= e(g, g)z e(H(GID), g)0
= e(g, g)z
(7)
Finally, the user can recover the message as
C0
D
=
M e(g, g)z
e(g, g)z
= M (8)
H. Using our scheme in multi-authority AMI networks
The aforementioned design goals can be achieved using our
attribute-based signcryption scheme by mapping the multi-
authority AMI network entities to our scheme as follows.
The DNOs’ set D and the vendors’ set V are mapped to
the universe of attribute authorities UΘ. This is because each
DNO and vendor should be able to issue different attributes
for their customers such as location attribute, electricity plan
attribute, DLC membership attribute, etc. Also, the same
sets are mapped to the universe of signer entities UΦ. This
is because DNOs and vendors need to send authenticated
multicast messages to their customers using signcryption. The
users’ set U is mapped to the universe of global identifiers
GID. Upon registration, each user Ui should receive its unique
prime number qi, decryption keys and a verification key from
the DNOs and vendors. In order to send a multicast message, a
DNO or vendor should define the monotonic boolean relation
under which a message is signcrypted and call the Signcrypt
algorithm. Then, the signcrypted text is broadcasted to all
users through the DCC and the hierarchal network structure.
According to [2] and [3], the DCC is the entity that manages
the supplier-users relationship, i.e., the DCC by default learns
the set of attributes of each user, but it does not know their
decryption keys. Therefore, the DCC is the entity that can
run the Revoke algorithm to ensure that users with revoked
attributes cannot decrypt the multicasted messages. Finally,
upon receiving a multicast message, the user checks if his non-
revoked attributes can satisfy the access policy, then he calls
the Designcrypt algorithm to decrypt the message, otherwise,
the message cannot be decrypted and should be discarded.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. Collusion Resistance
In collusion attack, several users may collude by combining
their attributes to satisfy the access policy of a ciphertext and
decrypt it, i.e., they combine their decryption keys to run the
designcrypt algorithm to decrypt a signcrypted text which they
cannot decrypt individually. This attack cannot succeed in our
scheme. During the designcryption process the shares of the
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Fig. 2: Signcryption time vs access policy size.
“0”, wx values, are crucially engaged to the global identifier
of the secret key of the user as in [19] and [26]. This is clear
in Equation 7 where the term
∏
e(H(GID), g)wxcx can be
reduced to e(H(GID), g)
∑
x∈S wxcx = e(H(GID), g)0 if and
only if a single GID is used. Therefore, in case that two or
more users collude and try to decrypt the same signcrypted
text, the “0-shares” will result in a failed decryption, which
can thwart collusion attacks.
B. Signature Forgery Resistance and Non-repudiation
In forgery attack, an adversary A may try to forge the
singcryption of a signer φ. As discussed in subsection V-E,
computing a valid signature of the signer φ requires the
knowledge of αφ and yφ to correctly compute the components
e(g, g)αφ and gyφ . A cannot obtain αφ and yφ from any
verification key KGID,φ = gαφH(GID)yφF (s)r as this requires
A to split the three components and solve the discrete logarith-
mic problem (DLP) for each component which is infeasible.
Therefore, our scheme can resist forging signatures and thus
ensure sender authentication and message non-repudiation
since entity φ is the only entity that can compute a valid
signature.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we compare our multi-authority attribute-
based signcryption (MA-ABSC) scheme to the closest similar
scheme in [25] which is a single-authority attribute-based
signcryption scheme (ABSC). We implemented both schemes
using Python charm cryptographic library [29]. Supersingular
elliptic curve with the symmetric Type 1 pairing of size 512
bits (SS512 curve) is used for all pairing operations. All
cryptographic operations were run 1,000 times and average
measurements are reported. Typically, DNOs, vendors and the
DCC have powerful computational resources. Therefore, in
our experiments, they are implemented by a workstation with
Intel Core i7-4765T 2.00 GHz and 8 GB RAM. The operations
done by the DNOs and vendors are the signcryption processes,
whereas the revocation process is executed by the DCC. On the
other hand, to implement the resource-limited SMs, we used
Tennessee Tech. University AMI testbed of 30 Raspberry-
Pi 3 devices with an ARM Cortex-A53, 1.2 GHz processor
and 1 GB RAM. The operation executed by the SMs is the
designcryption.
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Fig. 4: Revocation time vs number of users.
Figure 2 gives the signcryption time versus the access policy
size used to signcrypt a message. As shown in the figure, our
scheme has slightly higher signcryption time than the scheme
in [25]. Figure 3 gives the designcryption time versus the
number of attributes used during the designcryption process.
As shown in the figure, the designcryption time is close to that
of [25]. As compared to ABSC [25], the increased computation
cost in the signcryption and designcryption processes are
needed to allow multiple authorities to control their own
attributes which cannot be achieved in [25] that allows only a
single authority to control the whole attribute set.
Lastly, we plot in Figure 4 the revocation computation cost
of our scheme as the number of users with valid attributes
increases. ABSC [25] is not considered in this evaluation since
it does not support attribute revocation. As shown in the figure,
the revocation process adds an acceptable cost to our multicast
scheme and the times are in the range of milliseconds. For
instance, the revocation computation cost is only 0.34 second
for a case in which the access list contains 250 users with
valid attribute. To conclude, compared to the baseline attribute-
based signcryption scheme in [25], our scheme achieves more
features with acceptable additional computation cost.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed an attribute-based signcryption
scheme that can be used to secure SG downlink multi-
cast communication. The proposed scheme can achieve data
confidentiality, message source authentication, message non-
repudiation, and immediate attribute revocation, simultane-
ously which are required for secure multicast communications.
In addition, the scheme can resist collusion attacks in which
several users collude to decrypt a ciphertext they cannot
AND
W OR
X AND
Y Z
Fig. 5: Access Tree Example.
decrypt individually. Our security analysis confirms that the
proposed scheme is secure and can achieve the aforementioned
features. Our experiments conducted on the AMI testbed at
Tennessee Tech. University confirms that the proposed scheme
has low values of computational overheads which is required
for resource-constrained SMs.
APPENDIX A
GENERATING LSS MATRICES FROM MONOTONIC
BOOLEAN FORMULAS
A monotonic boolean formula can be represented as
a binary access tree in which interior nodes are AND
and OR gates while the leaf nodes represent attributes.
Figure 5 shows the access tree for the boolean formula
W AND
(
X OR (Y AND Z)
)
where W, X, Y, and Z are the
attributes.
According to [26], the following algorithm can convert a
monotonic boolean formula into an equivalent LSS matrix.
First, a counter c is initialized by one and the tree root node
is labeled with a vector (1) (a vector of length c). Then, each
child node is labeled with a vector determined by the vector
assigned to its parent node as follows. If the parent node is an
OR gate labeled by the vector v, then its children are labeled
by v (and the value of c stays the same). If the parent node is
an AND gate labeled by v, first v is padded with zeros at the
end (if necessary) to make it of length c. Then, one child node
is labeled with the vector v|1 (where | denotes appending a
new element to vector v) and the other child node is labeled
with the vector (0, . . . , 0)| − 1, where (0, . . . , 0) denotes a
zero vector of length c. Note that the summation of these two
vectors is v|0. Finally, c is incremented by one. The process
continues in a top-bottom manner until all the entire tree nodes
are labeled. Once the entire tree is labeled, the vectors labeling
the leaf nodes form the rows of the LSS matrix. If these
vectors have different lengths, the shorter vectors are padded
with zeros at the end.
For the tree shown in Figure 5, the root AND node is
labeled (1), its left child, node (W) node, is labeled (1, 1) while
its right child, node (OR), is labeled by (0,−1). Then, both
children of the OR node, nodes (X) and (AND), are labeled
(0,−1) as their parent. Finally, the left child of the AND node,
node (Y), is labeled (0,−1, 1) while the right child, node (Z),
is labeled (0,−1,−1). Figure 6 shows the fully labeled tree.
The resulting LSS matrix after padding leaf nodes is
1
1,1 0,-1
0,-1 0,-1
0,-1,1 0,0,-1
Fig. 6: Access Tree with Labels.
A =

1 1 0
0 −1 0
0 −1 1
0 0 −1

To generate the secret shares, let a secret z = 65, construct
the column vector v = (z, r2, . . . , rn) = (65, 3, 4) where 3, 4
are random numbers, then compute the shares vector λ = Av
as
λ = Av =

1 1 0
0 −1 0
0 −1 1
0 0 −1

653
4
 =

68
−3
1
−4

To reconstruct the secret, we recall
∑
i∈I ciλi = z. How-
ever, the aforementioned algorithm forces the reconstruction
coefficients {ci}i∈I to have a value of one. This means that
adding the secret shares corresponding to attributes validating
the boolean formula can reconstruct the secret. For example
(W AND X) can satisfy the boolean formula, therefore, adding
the shares corresponding to W, which is 68, to the share
corresponding to X, which is −3, can reconstruct the secret
65. The same applies to (W AND Y AND Z).
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